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          NO. 43667 
 
          Ada County Case No.  
          CR-2014-5888 
 
           
          RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
 
     
      Issue 
Has Dick failed to establish the district court abused its discretion by denying his 
Rule 35 motion for reduction of his unified sentence of 10 years, with four years fixed, 
imposed upon his guilty plea to felony domestic violence? 
 
 
Dick Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
 
 In April 2014, Dick battered his fiancée, Emily, who had been living with him for 
the past eight months.  (PSI, p.3.1)  Dick “pushed her down twice in the driveway which 
1 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “Dick 




                                            
caused her to fall over the decorative half-wall and left an abrasion on her back.”  (PSI, 
p.3.)  Emily ran into the house and locked all of the doors, but Dick gained entry into the 
home through the garage door and “pushed her on to their bed, straddled her, and 
punched her in the face between eight (8) and ten (10) times with closed fists.”  (PSI, 
p.3.)  He also “encircled her neck with both of his hands three (3) times and cut off her 
airway for between three (3) to five (5) seconds each time.  During the incident … [Dick] 
called her names and she said she feared for her life.”  (PSI, p.3.)  Emily was able to get 
away from Dick and called the police, at which time Dick fled the residence.  (PSI, p.3.)  
When officers responded, they noted Emily had “red marks” on both sides of her neck, 
abrasions under her jaw and on her back, and a swollen left eye.  (PSI, p.3.)  Shortly 
thereafter, Meridian police conducted a traffic stop on Dick’s vehicle and arrested him 
for DUI.  (PSI, p.3.)  Dick refused to participate in field sobriety tests, but submitted to 
breathalyzer testing, which returned results of .153/.143 BAC.  (PSI, p.3.)   
The state charged Dick with attempted strangulation, felony domestic violence, 
unlawful possession of a firearm, and misdemeanor DUI (second within 10 years).  (R., 
pp.60-62.)  Pursuant to a plea agreement, Dick pled guilty to felony domestic violence 
and the state dismissed the remaining charges.  (R., p.70.)  Approximately one week 
before his sentencing hearing, Dick was arrested for violating the no contact order with 
the victim and for DUI.  (PSI, pp.112-113.)   
At the sentencing hearing for the instant offense, the district court imposed a 
unified sentence of 10 years, with four years fixed.  (R., pp.70-73.)  Dick filed a timely 
Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence, which the district court denied on March 24, 
2015.  (R., pp.75-84, 106-111.)  On October 13, 2015, Dick filed a Motion to Allow Late 
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Notice of Appeal Rule 35, together with a copy of his notice of appeal, asserting he 
delivered his notice of appeal to the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office for mailing on May 
5, 2015.  (R., pp.112-118.)  On October 27, 2015, the district court entered an order 
directing the clerk to file Dick’s notice of appeal, and the notice of appeal was filed the 
same day.  (R., pp.123-128.)  On November 9, 2015, this Court entered an order 
conditionally dismissing Dick’s appeal.  (Order Conditionally Dismissing Appeal.)  Dick 
subsequently filed a response to the conditional dismissal and, on January 13, 2016, 
this Court entered an order withdrawing the conditional dismissal.  (Response to 
Conditional Dismissal; Order Withdrawing Conditional Dismissal.)  Dick’s notice of 
appeal – if submitted to jail officials on May 5, 2015 – was timely, under the prison 
mailbox rule,2 only from the district court’s order denying his Rule 35 motion.  (R., 
pp.125-128.)   
Dick asserts the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion 
for a reduction of sentence in light of his claim the court “did not exercise due caution 
when it considered, at sentencing, the facts of [his] arrest” for violation of a no contact 
order and DUI, which occurred after he pled guilty to the instant offense.  (Appellant’s 
Brief, pp.4-6; R., p.66.)  Dick has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.   
In State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007), the Idaho 
Supreme Court observed that a Rule 35 motion “does not function as an appeal of a 
 
2 Under the “mailbox rule,” notices of appeal filed by inmates are deemed to be filed on 
the date they are delivered to prison officials for filing with the court.  State v. Lee, 117 
Idaho 203, 786 P.2d 594 (Ct. App. 1990), cited with approval in Munson v. State, 128 




                                            
sentence.”  The Court noted that where a sentence is within statutory limits, a Rule 35 
motion is merely a request for leniency, which is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  Id.  
Thus, “[w]hen presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence 
is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district 
court in support of the Rule 35 motion.”  Id.  Absent the presentation of new evidence, 
“[a]n appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review 
the underlying sentence.”  Id.  Accord State v. Adair, 145 Idaho 514, 516, 181 P.3d 440, 
442 (2008).   
Dick did not appeal the judgment of conviction in this case, and he provided no 
new information in support of his Rule 35 motion.  He merely argued his sentence 
should be reduced because he felt he “was assumed guilty of the [violation of a no 
contact order and DUI] misdemeanors before [he] was allowed the opportunity of due 
process of [sic] the misdemeanors,” and his sentencing in this case “should have been 
postponed until after [he] was allowed due process and proven [his] innocence” in the 
new case.  (R., pp.76-77.)  In the same motion, Dick admitted he violated the no contact 
order on at least two occasions and that he drove “despite [his] inability to drive,” but 
justified his conduct by claiming the victim had been removing property from his 
residence, where she and her children resided for the eight months preceding the 
instant offense.  (R., pp.78-80; PSI, p.3.)  This information was available at the time of 
sentencing; however, Dick chose not to provide the information he felt should have 
been considered, and specifically declined to clarify or add to the information contained 
in the police reports detailing the new DUI and no contact order violation – although he 
was given the opportunity, at sentencing, to do so.  (Tr., p.7, L.16 – p.8, L.5; p.24, L.18 
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– p.25, L.19.)  He also failed to request the continuance to which he later claimed he 
was entitled, and in fact, when asked at sentencing whether there was any legal reason 
as to why sentence should not be imposed at that time, his counsel stated there was 
not.  (Tr., p.25, Ls.21-24.)   
Rule 35 functions to allow a defendant to request leniency in light of “new or 
additional” information that was not available at the time of sentencing, not to allow a 
defendant to purposefully withhold information that was clearly available at the time of 
sentencing so he can later present it as “new” for the purpose of a Rule 35 motion.  
Because Dick presented no new information in support of his Rule 35 motion, he failed 
to demonstrate in the motion that his sentence is excessive.  Having failed to make 
such a showing, he has failed to establish any basis for reversal of the district court’s 
order denying his Rule 35 motion.   
Even if this Court addresses the merits of Dick’s claim, he has still failed to 
establish an abuse of discretion.  On appeal, Dick argues the district court “did not 
exercise due caution when it considered, at sentencing, the facts of [his] arrest” for 
violation of a no contact order and DUI, which occurred after he pled guilty to the instant 
offense, but before sentencing in this case.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.4-6; R., p.66.)  The 
district court has broad discretion in determining what evidence is to be admitted at a 
sentencing hearing.  State v. Martinez, 154 Idaho 940, 947, 303 P.3d 627, 634 (Ct. App. 
2013) (citations omitted).  The sentencing judge is presumably able to ascertain the 
relevancy and reliability of the broad range of information and material presented to it 
during the sentencing process and to disregard the irrelevant and unreliable.  Id. at 947-
948, 303 P.3d at 634-635 (citations omitted).  It is well established that a sentencing 
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court may, with appropriate caution, consider a defendant's alleged criminal conduct for 
which he has not been convicted or for which charges have been dismissed.  State v. 
Thomas, 133 Idaho 800, 804, 992 P.2d 795, 799 (Ct. App. 1999) (citations omitted).   
Dick’s assertion the district court “did not exercise due caution” when it 
considered his new charges in sentencing him for the instant offense is without merit.  
(Appellant’s brief, p.4.)  When sentencing Dick for the instant offense, the district court 
expressly stated, “I agree with [Dick’s trial counsel] that these [new charges] are only 
accusations at this point.”  (Tr., p.26, Ls.4-5 (emphasis added).)  The court noted, 
however, that “a very thorough investigation was done by the police, according to the 
reports that are contained here,” and consideration of the accusations was reasonable 
particularly because the new charges involved the same victim and the same type of 
criminal behavior.  (Tr., p.26, Ls.5-10; R., p.109.)  The court went on to articulate its 
consideration of numerous other factors, including the seriousness of the instant 
offense, the great harm done to the victim, Dick’s failure to accept full responsibility for 
his criminal conduct, his ongoing alcohol abuse and violent criminal offending, and his 
failure to rehabilitate or be deterred despite his repeated convictions for crimes involving 
his alcohol abuse and domestic violence.  (Tr., p.26, L.11 – p.28, L.24.)  As such, it is 
clear the district court exercised “due caution” in considering Dick’s pending charges for 
DUI and violation of a no contact order as “only accusations,” and it did not sentence 
Dick based solely on the new charges.  Dick has failed to establish the district court 
erred by considering his pending charges.    
Dick’s assertion that the district court abused its discretion because it “was not 
aware of all the circumstances surrounding” the new charges likewise fails.  (Appellant’s 
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Brief, p.4.)  As previously noted, Dick admitted in his Rule 35 motion that he violated the 
no contact order with the victim on several occasions and that he drove “despite [his] 
inability to drive.”  (R., pp.78-80.)  His argument in support of his Rule 35 motion 
primarily consisted of setting forth justifications for his “poor decision” to violate the no 
contact order and commit the new DUI – purportedly to “retrieve [his] property,” which 
he felt the victim had wrongfully removed from the residence they previously shared.  
(R., pp.78-80.)  In its order denying Dick’s Rule 35 request, the district court advised 
that Dick’s excuses for engaging in the newly charged criminal conduct, even if known 
at the time of sentencing, “would not have affected the sentence.”  (R., p.109.)  The 
court stated, “Defendant attempts to place blame on the victim as explanation for why 
he violated the no contact order in this case; however, the facts alleged by Defendant 
do not justify or provide new information to the crime to which he pled guilty.”  (R., 
pp.109-110.)  The court indicated it imposed Dick’s sentence based largely on “the 
horrific nature of the crime” and “in order to protect society and deter Defendant.”  (R., 
p.110.)  The district court also noted Dick’s “statement of ‘new’ facts is essentially 
asking the Court to take into account mitigating circumstances for why he committed the 
new charges against him that are not before this Court,” and, “Defendant’s allegations 
that the victim ‘broke into his house and stole certain items’ are irrelevant to the fact that 
Defendant horribly beat the victim before she allegedly did these bad acts, and 
immaterial to the sentence imposed.”  (R., p.110 (emphasis original).)   
The district court considered all of the relevant information and appropriately 
determined that Dick’s justifications for committing the new crimes did not merit a 
reduction of his sentence for the instant offense, particularly in light of the egregious 
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nature of the offense and the great harm done to the victim.  The district court’s decision 
not to reduce Dick’s sentence was also appropriate in light of Dick’s longstanding 
pattern of abusive behavior and driving while intoxicated, his “moderate to high” risk to 
violently reoffend, and his failure to rehabilitate or be deterred despite prior legal 
sanctions and treatment opportunities.  (PSI, pp.6-11, 14, 38.)  Given any reasonable 
view of the facts, Dick has failed to establish the district court abused its discretion by 
denying his Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence.  
 
Conclusion 
 The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court’s order denying 
Dick’s Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence. 




      __/s/_________________________ 
      JESSICA M. LORELLO 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
      VICTORIA RUTLEDGE 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 17th day of May, 2016, served a true and 
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic copy to: 
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  DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
 




      __/s/_________________________ 
     JESSICA M. LORELLO 
Deputy Attorney General    
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